I have long regarded the new way of ideas stemming from Descartes as a disaster for epistemology. One such Cartesian assumption is a supposed paradigm for basic empirical data as content of one's conscious state, construed subjectively so that one is taken to have infallible immediate access that not even Descartes's malin génie could deceive one about. Another is a deductive paradigm for what one can know on the basis of given assumptions, according to which only that which logically follows from the assumptions can be taken to be known on the basis of those assumptions. I am delighted to see Westphal interpreting Kant as anti-Cartesian: "Infallibilism and deductivism are the twin assumptions of Cartesian skepticism. Kant rejects both of them, both in his account of transcendental knowledge and in his account of empirical knowledge" (p. 259).
I see these Cartesian assumptions as a radical proposal for a new paradigm for knowledge to replace the common-sense conception of knowledge as public and fallible. The extraordinary extent to which this paradigm had infected the work of philosophers by Kant's day made Kant's alternative account of empirical truth a remarkable achievement. Like a number of others, I have seen Kant's appeal to formal conditions of experience as supporting an empirical realism, according to which scientific knowledge is supported as a natural outgrowth of the empirical application of the same principles that underlie ordinary knowledge of public everyday objects of experience. One striking innovation in Westphal's book is an interpretation of Kant's hitherto little-studied passages on transcendental affinity to argue that Kant has provided a successful argument for not just formal but material conditions for possible experience. These material conditions are the sort of very general facts of nature, without which we would not and could not have the practices we do. This makes Kant anticipate important anti-Cartesian arguments of Wittgenstein. Westphal sees this as giving Kant a successful transcendental argument for realism sans phrase .
Westphal sees Kant as achieving philosophically significant implications for rational agency, the justification of causal judgements, and perceptual scepticism. I am especially impressed with the contribution his treatment of Kant's argument for material conditions on possible experience makes to the significance of Kant's case against perceptual scepticism.
Westphal's treatment of Kant's account of rational agency argues that Kant's three Analogies of Experience together with his Paralogisms show that we can only make legitimate causal judgements regarding spatiotemporal objects and events. He sees this as sufficient to underwrite a denial of psychological determinism, thus opening the way for free agency. This may sound somewhat like the usual treatment of Kant's defence of free agency which takes it to depend on transcendental idealism. Such a treatment limits causal determinism to spatiotemporal objects and events construed as appearances and purports to leave room for freedom of rational agents construed as noumena. According to Westphal, Kant's transcendental idealism is not needed to defend freedom for rational agents.
The required elbow room lies elsewhere: none of Kant's theoretical arguments suffice to prove strict universal causal determinism. Kant claims in the Analogies to justify universal causal determinism among spatiotemporal phenomena. However, I have yet to find an argument, either by Kant or by his commentators, to support his claim that uncaused states of affairs "cannot be admitted as an occurrence among the appearances, for its possibility alone would already undermine the unity of experience. " (p. 237) As one of the commentators who has investigated Kant's arguments in the Analogies, I want to heartily endorse this failure to find a successful argument for causal determinism. It will, I hope, be useful to contrast this failure with what I take to be Kant's quite successful ordering argument to necessary connections from his empirical realism.
Kant's Ordering Argument
Consider one of Newton's pendulum experiments. A ten-foot pendulum is pulled back about six feet and let go. Let us specify A : "this pendulum being just to the left of vertical when observed from where I am"; and B : "this pendulum being just to the right of vertical when observed from the same place." These states are generic enough to be able to obtain in either order. What I perceive is an instance of the alteration A being followed by B ( rather than the reverse). An instance of A is much more deter-minate than what is specified in A . As an empirically real object of experience it is determinable to the extent that empirical predicates can be applied to what is before me when I now observe A to be the case. On the account of empirical truth Kant specifies in the famous third paragraph in the B-edition of the second analogy, if it is empirically true that in this instance the object of my experience first satisfies empirical content sufficient for A and afterwards the object of my experience satisfies empirical content sufficient for B then the following holds:
There is a more determinate state A ´ that includes A and that obtained when A obtained in this instance, and there is a more determinate state B ´ that includes B and that obtained when B obtained in this instance, and the empirical criteria for A ´ together with the empirical criteria for B ´ rule out the possibility of any alteration in which B ´ is followed by A ´.
Thus, there is a true irreversibility law according to which no possible object of experience could be an instance of an alteration in which B ´ precedes A ´ .
Given his empirical realism, Kant has a good argument to the conclusion of the ordering argument Now in order for this to be cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be thought in such a way that it is thereby necessarily determined which of them must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa. (B234)
He goes on to say
The concept, however, that carries a necessary synthetic unity with it can only be a pure concept of the understanding, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the relation of cause and effect , the former of which determines the latter as its consequence. (B234; emphasis mine)
One natural way to read this causal determination would be to want the instance of A to be an instance of a richer state A ´ , such that no possible object of experience could be an instance of A ´ without being followed by an instance of B . A successful argument that there is such an A ´ for any coming to be of a state B would be a successful argument for Kant's transcendental causal thesis that every event has a cause.
To see that it is not likely that anyone ever will come up with a successful argument for this causal thesis consider the famous two-slit experiment in quantum mechanics. Let A be an instance of an experimental set-up where an electron is emitted toward the two slits and the detector screen behind them and let B be the corresponding instance where the electron is detected at a certain location on the detection screen. We have irreversibility laws that fix the order of the alteration to be A followed by B rather than the reverse, but, according to classical Quantum Mechanics, no matter how richly we specify this instance of A there will not be an A ´ sufficient to determine that it would be followed by an instance of state B where the electron is detected at the specified location on the detector screen. It would, I think, be quite incredible if Kant could have provided an a priori argument sufficient to show that classical Quantum Mechanics is false.
I therefore agree with Westphal that Kant's arguments in the analogies are not sufficient to prove causal determinism. If classical Quantum Mechanics is right then this coming to be of B violates Kant's transcendental causal thesis that every event has a deterministic cause. The coming to be in this example from Quantum Mechanics is an example where it appears that what Westphal distinguishes as the metaphysical causal thesis Kant needs-that every physical event has an external physical causefails. This raises questions about how we ought to regard Westphal's claim:
Resolving the problem posed by the distinction between the transcendental and the metaphysical causal theses requires, not idealism, but further transcendental analysis and epistemic reflection. These together with careful consideration of Kant's semantics of cognitive reference, suffice to warrant the metaphysical causal thesis that every physical event has an external physical cause. (p. 244) Indeed, even without the example from Quantum Mechanics, there is some tension between this claim and Wesphal's earlier remark:
It suffices that Kant's arguments about the causal basis of time-determination show that we can only identify the temporal order of what we experience to the extent that we can identify its causal order. Identifying a causal order sufficient for us to be self aware, or to be aware of ourselves as having an extended, even an extensively integrated history of experiences of causal events, appears to be compatible with our failing to identify the causes of some events, or even with the occurrence of some uncaused events. (p. 238) The context of this earlier remark suggests that the uncaused events in it may be intended to be restricted to rational decisions of agents-this would be compatible with the metaphysical causal thesis if rational decisions were not physical events. Our example from Quantum Mechanics, however, makes it clear that we have very good grounds to accept that Kant's metaphysical causal thesis does indeed fail.
Deduction as a Paradigm for Inference
Westphal is quite correct to point out that Kant's empirical realism is a deductivist model of scientific knowledge. The account of empirical truth outlined above shares in the second of Descartes' objectionable assumptions, even though it avoids the first. Though I have been able to account for a number of interesting ways the foregoing account of empirical truth goes beyond more usual sorts verificationism (including an account of how commitment to the first analogy could support inferences to the existence of unobservably small constituents of macroscopic bodies) (Harper 1992, pp. 275-76) , I do not think it can do justice to every sort of legitimate scientific practice.
In his Principia , Newton developed and applied another alternative to Descartes. This richer sort of empirical method led to the transformation of natural philosophy into natural science as we understand it today. By Kant's day the successes of this alternative Newtonian method had made both of Descartes's theses (and Cartesian methods generally) irrelevant to the practice of this science. Though irrelevant to the practice of what had become an independent natural science, the Cartesian sceptical theses had become defining issues for philosophy. So Kant's successful refutation of Descartes's first thesis was a major accomplishment. As Westphal has pointed out, though incorrigible sensations are no longer widely taken as paradigms of empirical data, Descartes's second thesis-the deductive paradigm for inference from assumptions-continues to infect much of philosophy to this day.
In his scholium to the Laws of Motion Newton tells his readers, "the principles I have set forth are accepted by mathematicians and confirmed by experiments of many kinds" (1999, p. 424) . In Books I and II of Principia he develops propositions from these laws which make possible the measurement of forces from phenomena of motion. For example, the first two propositions of Book I and their corollaries give the equivalence between the centripetal direction of the force maintaining a body in an orbit about an inertial centre and the constancy of the rate at which areas are swept out in that orbit by radii from that centre. They also make an increasing areal rate equivalent to having the force off-centre in the direction of motion and a decreasing areal rate equivalent to having the force off-centre in the opposite direction. These systematic dependencies make the areal law phenomenon for an orbit measure the centripetal direction of the force maintaining a body in that orbit. Similar systematic dependencies make the harmonic law for a system of orbits, as well as the absence of precession in any single orbit, measure the inverse-square power law for the centripetal accelerations exhibited by those orbits. In Book III, Newton infers inverse-square centripetal acceleration fields about the sun, Jupiter, and Saturn from the phenomena exhibited by orbits of bodies about them.
These inferences are not deductions of these acceleration fields from the orbital phenomena; nor are they deductions from the phenomena together with the theorems giving the systematic dependencies. Newton's conclu-sion of an inverse-square acceleration field about the sun supports inferences to counterfactual cases. To each location about the sun it assigns a component centripetal acceleration toward the sun that would apply to a body if it were at that location. These clearly go beyond what follows logically from the theorems together with the phenomena cited for the orbits of the planets. Newton's fourth rule for doing natural philosophy endorses such inferences:
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. (Newton 1999, p. 706) This is decidedly anti-Cartesian in that contrary hypotheses do not have to be ruled out deductively to be dismissed as irrelevant to accepting propositions inferred from phenomena. I have argued that Newton's method is guided by an ideal of empirical success where inferred powers are accurately measured by the phenomena they purport to explain.
1 An alternative proposition would have to realize this ideal of empirical success sufficiently to be counted as a serious rival to justify not being dismissed as a mere contrary hypothesis.
Kant was not happy with Newton's own defence of his inferences from phenomena. He wanted the laws of motion to count as a priori rather than as propositions accepted on the basis of empirical evidence. I think Westphal is quite right to attack Kant's attempts to argue for a priori status for his versions of these laws. A very exciting result in Westphal's book is his argument that extending the material conditions for possible experience Kant argued for would support a methodology that would go beyond what his empirical realism could support. I think it may well be that the extended Kantian methods suggested by Westphal would be able to do justice to Newton's much richer method for doing natural philosophy.
Kant's Third Analogy and Simultaneity
Like Guyer, Westphal holds that the principles Kant defends in the Analogies form an integrated set.
We can only use any one of the principles of the Analogies by conjointly using all three, in order to identify and discriminate rule governed causal processes of various forms, including changes of state, local motions, translational motions, radical transformation of substances, or any forms of causal interaction between substances. (p. 247) Kant's third Analogy is a principle that causal reciprocity is required between substances that can be perceived to co-exist in space. Here is a central claim he argues for.
In addition to the mere existence there must be something through which A determines the position of B in time, and conversely also something by which B does the same for A , since only under these conditions can those substances be empirically represented as existing simultaneously . (B 259; my emphasis) We can use Newton's appeal to centre-of-mass frames to illustrate the sort of mutual determination Kant is describing here. Newton used the orbits of planets about the sun and Jupiter's moons about Jupiter to measure inverse-square acceleration fields about them. The relative strengths of these acceleration fields measured the relative masses of the sun and Jupiter to be in about the ratio 1067 to 1. We can consider an isolated twobody system of the sun and Jupiter to be one where each orbits their centre of mass. The sun moves in a small circle of radius 1 unit, while Jupiter moves in the opposite direction in a circle of radius 1067 units. The two orbits correspond to the two ends of a straight line joining them through their centre of mass. In this centre-of-mass frame the acceleration of Jupiter toward the sun is 1067 times the acceleration of the sun towards Jupiter. This makes the mass of the sun times its acceleration towards Jupiter the equal and oppositely directed reaction to the mass of Jupiter times its acceleration towards the sun construed as the action of the sun on Jupiter. In this frame, at any instant Newton's third law of motion obtains to make these oppositely directed action and reaction count as an instantaneous mutual interaction at a distance. This centre-of-mass construction can be carried out for all the interacting bodies in the solar system, so that in this frame each body simultaneously accelerates toward each of the others with accelerations proportional to their masses. So, in the centre-of-mass frame the accelerations of any pair towards one another count as instantaneous mutual interactions at a distance.
The mutual interaction Kant argues for in the third Analogy of Experience is exactly this simultaneous instantaneous equal and opposite action and reaction between each pair of bodies in the solar system centreof-mass frame according to Newton's theory of universal gravitation. One of the main lessons of Einstein's spacial and general theories is that such instantaneous mutual interactions at a distance do not occur. The current ephemeris, which gives the most accurate available account of the mutual motions of solar system bodies, contains numerous relativistic corrections that modify the motions that Newtonian theory would give. Newton's methodology is one in which theoretical propositions are provisionally accepted as guides to further research. Deviations from the model established at a given stage are sought for to be exploited as carry-ing information that can guide construction of a more accurate successor model. This methodology of successive approximations was strikingly realized in the application of Newton's theory of gravity to the motions of solar system bodies. The Keplerian orbits for each planet are accepted as initial assumptions in a process in which the daunting complexity of solar system motions can be addressed by successive approximations. The deviations at each stage are theory-mediated phenomena to be exploited as carrying information about further interactions to be taken into account. I have argued that, contrary to Thomas Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability, the revolutionary transition from Newton's theory of gravity to Einstein's is in accordance with Newton's own methodology. 2 See Standish et al. 1992. 3 See my "Newton's Methodology and Mercury's Perihelion before and after Einstein" (2007) .
